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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the nexus between uncertainty shocks and income inequality in the US states.
Uncertainty shocks impact the wider economy through a range of various channels. For instance, if
uncertainty increases, companies change their investment and hiring behavior, leading to a decline in real
activity. This drop in output may impact aggregate demand which, in turn, affects prices. Movements in
quantities related to these channels are typically perceived as important determinants of income inequality
(Piketty and Saez, 2003; Roine et al., 2009; Coibion et al., 2017). In this contribution, we propose a large-
scale dynamicmodel to analyze howmovements in uncertainty impact household income inequalitywithin
US states. Our model enables us to capture dynamics between national macroeconomic fundamentals
and state-level variables related to the distribution of income, a feature that is novel to the literature.
The recent literature on uncertainty shocks (see, inter alia, Bloom, 2009; Caggiano et al., 2014; Jurado
et al., 2015; Caldara et al., 2016; Baker et al., 2016; Basu and Bundick, 2017; Mumtaz and Theodoridis,
2018; Carriero et al., 2018) increasingly discriminates between different types of uncertainty. In his
seminal contribution, Bloom (2009), for instance, uses the volatility index of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange as an observed measure of uncertainty that is closely related to financial market uncertainty.
As opposed to uncertainty arising from financial markets, real macroeconomic uncertainty is associated
with unexpected fluctuations in output or prices. Other studies highlight that uncertainty might also be
linked to unexpected actions of policy makers in central banks and the government (Baker et al., 2016).
All types of uncertainty have in common, however, that they are generally perceived to be detrimental
for economic performance, at least in the short-run. For instance, the latest global financial crisis can be
viewed as a US-based uncertainty shock that ultimately engulfed the world economy and led to a sharp
decline in economic activity.
During economic downturns, income inequality has been found to decrease (see, for instance, Heath-
cote et al., 2010; Petev et al., 2011; Meyer and Sullivan, 2013; Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou, 2017;
Theophilopoulou, 2018). This finding, however, depends on the composition of income. A potential
explanation might be that capital owners are more exposed to adverse business cycle movements, which
are often accompanied by sharp declines in corporate profits and stock prices. By contrast, if the income
share of capital is comparatively low in a given economy, inequality could also increase during recessions.
This is due to the notion that less skilled workers are typically more vulnerable to movements in labor
markets and technological change. Understanding the mechanisms that give rise to changes in income
inequality proves to be important for policy makers in governmental institutions and central banks alike,
since several studies highlight the relation between household income inequality and the emergence of
crises (see, for instance, Stiglitz, 2012; van Treeck, 2014, and the references therein).
The empirical literature dealing with the dynamic relationship between uncertainty and income in-
equality is non-existent or sparse, at best (see Theophilopoulou, 2018, for a notable exception). The
present contribution attempts to fill this gap by considering data on unemployment, real income, em-
ployment, and a survey-based measure of income inequality for all US states, including the District of
Columbia. State-level information is complemented by a set of national macroeconomic aggregates that
serve as common driving factors of state business cycles. Taking such a regional perspective allows a
detailed investigation on whether national uncertainty shocks yield asymmetric responses across space
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while the inclusion of covariates at the national level provides the possibility to inspect the transmission
mechanisms of uncertainty shocks on income inequality in more detail.
For addressing the research question, we suggest a parsimonious framework closely related to the
global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model proposed in Pesaran et al. (2004). The model approach
differs along several important dimensions. First, inspired by the panel data literature, state-specific
regression coefficients are assumed to arise from an underlying common distribution. This improves
estimation accuracy while maintaining sufficient flexibility to allow for differing features across states.
Second, one key assumption of themodel is that contemporaneous relations among the states and variables
are driven by a small number of latent factors. This reduces the amount of free parameters to be estimated
significantly. Third, we assume that all shocks to the system are heteroscedastic and follow a flexible
stochastic volatility specification. Finally, structural identification of the uncertainty shock is achieved
by using the measure proposed in Baker et al. (2016) that approximates general macroeconomic policy
uncertainty.
The empirical findings reveal that uncertainty shocks lead to heterogeneous responses across space,
with most US states displaying decreasing levels of income inequality while some few, predominantly
located in the Midwest, exhibit increasing levels of income dispersion. Forecast error variance and
historical decompositions identify uncertainty to be an important driver of variation in income inequality,
especially for certain regions and during selected time periods. Explaining the differences in income
inequality reactions by means of a simple regression exercise shows that differences across states may be
explained by the composition of income and labor market fundamentals.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric framework
adopted while Section 3 provides a brief summary of the dataset used and specifics about model spec-
ification and structural identification. Section 4 describes the empirical findings based on structural
impulse responses, forecast error and historical decompositions, combined with a brief discussion on
what determines differences in inequality responses. The last section summarizes and concludes the
paper.
2. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the empirical framework. Section 2.1 presents the global vector autoregressive
model for state-specific quantities augmented with variables at the national level. A flexible specification
for modeling co-movement and time-variation in the variance-covariance matrix is provided. Section 2.2
discusses prior selection required for Bayesian estimation of the model.
2.1. The model
To measure the impact of uncertainty on income inequality across US states, a suitable econometric
framework is necessary. Inclusion of the N = 51 US states alongside a moderate number of state-specific
endogenous variables calls for a modeling approach that adequately captures dynamic relations in the data.
We follow Pesaran et al. (2004) and propose a variant of the GVAR model involving N small-scale state-
specific models. These state models feature domestic variables, indexed by i = 1, . . . , N and collected
in the k-dimensional vector {yit }Tt=1, besides cross-sectional averages of foreign variables specific to each
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state,1 collected in the k-dimensional vector
y∗it =
N∑
j=1
wi j y jt, (1)
where the weights wi j (i, j = 1, . . . , N ) represent the connectivity relationships between the N states. By
convention, wii = 0,wi j ≥ 0 and ∑Nj=1 wi j = 1 for all i, j. The higher the connectedness is between states
i and j (that is, the larger wi j is), the more state i is exposed to externalities arising in state j.
The state economies may then be modeled as a vector autoregression (VAR) augmented by a vector of
lagged foreign variables, and a set of national macroeconomic aggregates that are assumed to be important
determinants of state business cycle dynamics,
yit = θi +
P∑
p=1
Aipyit−p +
Q∑
q=1
Biq y
∗
it−q + Ci zt−1 +  it,  it ∼ N (0,Σit ). (2)
Hereby, θi is a k-dimensional intercept vector, while Aip (p = 1, . . . , P) and Biq (q = 1, . . . ,Q) are
k × k matrices of unknown parameters, respectively. Ci is a k × ` matrix of regression coefficients
associated with ` national macroeconomic aggregates collected in zt . The error term  it follows a zero
mean Gaussian distribution with a time-varying variance-covariance matrix Σit .
The national aggregates in zt follow a VAR process,
zt =
P∑
p=1
Dpzt−p +
Q∑
q=1
Sq z
∗
t−q + ut, ut ∼ N (0,Ξt ), (3)
with Dp (p = 1, . . . , P) and Sq (q = 1, . . . ,Q) denoting ` × ` and ` × k coefficient matrices. To establish
dependencies between the national aggregates and the state-specific variables, Eq. (3) also features
averages of the k state-level quantities over N states, denoted by z∗t = (z∗1t, . . . , z
∗
kt )
′. Again, we assume
the error term ut to follow a Gaussian distribution centered on zero with time-varying variance-covariance
matrix Ξt .
To capture contemporaneous relations among the elements in yt = (y′1t, . . . , y
′
Nt )
′ and zt , we assume
that the shock vector εt = (u′t,  ′1t, . . . , 
′
Nt )
′ of size L = kN + ` has a factor stochastic volatility structure
(Aguilar and West, 2000),2 that is,
εt = Λ ft + ηt . (4)
ft ∼ N (0,Ht ) represents a set of F ( L) common static factors with zero mean, Λ is an L × F
matrix of factor loadings, and ηt ∼ N (0,Ωt ) denotes an L-dimensional idiosyncratic noise vector. The
variance-covariance matrices Ht = diag[exp(h1t ), . . . , exp(hFt )] and Ωt = diag[exp(ω1t ), . . . , exp(ωLt )]
are diagonal matrices, implying that any co-movement across the elements in εt stems from the common
factors. We control for heteroscedasticity of the shocks by assuming that the logarithm of the main
diagonal elements follows an autoregressive process of order one. This setup implies that Var(εt ) =
ΛHtΛ
′ +Ωt := Θt .
1Domestic in the sense of within and foreign in the sense of outside the state concerned.
2See Huber (2016) for a variant of the GVAR model that features a factor stochastic volatility specification on the shocks.
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Following Aguilar and West (2000), the logarithms of the main diagonal elements of Ht and Ωt are
assumed to evolve according to independent first-order autoregressive processes,
h jt = φh j + ρh j (h jt−1 − φh j ) + σh jξh j,t for j = 1, . . . , F, (5)
ω jt = φω j + ρω j (ω jt−1 − φω j ) + σω jξω j,t for j = 1, . . . , L, (6)
and using s ∈ {h, ω}, we denote the unconditional mean of the log-volatility by φs j , the autoregressive
parameter by ρs j , and σ2s j is the innovation variance of the processes. The serially uncorrelated white
noise shocks ξs j,t ∼ N (0, 1) are standard normally distributed.
Since unrestricted estimation of the model typically translates into overfitting issues, additional struc-
ture on the coefficients of the model in Eq. (2) is imposed. In what follows, we assume that the
M = k (1 + Pk +Qk + `) vectorized regression coefficients βi = vec[(θi, Ai1, . . . , AiP, Bi1, . . . , BiQ,Ci)′]
for state i = 1, . . . , N arise from a common distribution,
βi ∼ N (µ,V ), (7)
where µ denotes a common mean and V = diag(v1, . . . , vM ) a variance-covariance matrix. Notice that
v j ( j = 1, . . . ,M) provides a natural measure of similarity between the jth element in βi (i = 1, . . . , N )
across states, controlling the magnitude of potential deviations from µ j , the jth element µ. The presence
of the common distribution implies that our framework is a hierarchical model that is related to random
coefficient models in microeconometrics (Verbeke and Lesaffre, 1996; Allenby et al., 1998) and the panel
VAR specification outlined in Jarociński (2010).
2.2. Bayesian estimation
Estimating the model requires Bayesian methods that involve choosing adequate prior distributions for
the parameters.3 Notice that in Section 2.1, the vectorized VAR coefficients βi arise from a common
distribution. Equation (7) can be interpreted as a prior distribution on βi with mean µ and diagonal
variance-covariance matrix V . On µ, we use a normally distributed prior,
µ ∼ N (0,V0), (8)
and set V0 = 10 × I .
For the main diagonal elements of V , v j ( j = 1, . . . ,M), we adopt independent inverted Gamma
priors,
v j ∼ G−1(d0, d1), (9)
where the prior hyperparameters d0 = d1 = 0.01 are set to be only weakly informative.
The coefficient matrices Dp and Sq for the national quantities are assigned a Gaussian prior with the
mean vector centered on zero with variance ten. This choice introduces relatively little prior information
on these coefficients.
3For recent Bayesian expositions to GVAR models, see Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2016); Feldkircher and Huber (2016), and
Huber et al. (2017).
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For the factor specification in the reduced form errors of the model, we employ the following prior
setup. The elements λi j of the matrix of factor loadings Λ for i = 1, . . . , L and j = 1, . . . , F are
assigned a normally distributed prior, that is, λi j ∼ N (0, 0.1). The prior specification on the log-volatility
equations closely follows Kastner and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2014), with a normally distributed prior on
φs j ∼ N (0, 102), a Gamma prior on σ2s j ∼ G(1/2, 1/2) and a Beta prior on the transformed persistence
parameter (ρs j + 1)/2 ∼ B(25, 5).
After specifying suitable prior distributions, estimation is carried out using a Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. This algorithm is based on drawing from well-known conditional posterior
distributions until convergence is achieved. In this study, we run our algorithm 50,000 times where
we discard the first 25,000 draws as burn-in. Inference presented throughout this paper is based on
considering every fifth draw from the stored posterior distributions. Appendix A provides details on the
MCMC algorithm.
3. DATA, MODEL SPECIFICATION, AND STRUCTURAL IDENTIFICATION
This section establishes the state-level measure of household income inequality and provides a brief
summary of the dataset in Section 3.1, while outlining specifics about model specification and structural
identification in Section 3.2.
3.1. Data
To estimate our model, we use a panel of quarterly data starting in 1985:Q1 to 2017:Q1. The inequality
measure for all the states is constructed using data from theAnnual Social andEconomic Supplement of the
Current Population Survey (CPS, Flood et al., 2017). Income is defined as equivalized household income
on the square root scale (see OECD, 2011). Accordingly, we divide the sum of all individual incomes in
a given household by the square root of the number of its members to obtain a measure of income that is
comparable across different household sizes. The measure on household income includes all types of total
pre-tax income or losses. We take the well-known Gini coefficient as our scalar measure of household
income inequality (Cowell and Flachaire, 2015).4 To produce unbiased household-level statistics per year
and state, we rely on the complex stratified sampling scheme of the CPS. Here, the last available census
resident population characteristics are taken as a reference for creating representative household weights
to achieve accurate estimates for the entire population based on the information contained in the survey
sample.5 This annual measure of household income inequality is interpolated to the quarterly frequency
using splines.
The remaining three state-level quantities in yit are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis database. More specifically, we make use of data for unemployment, employment, and real per
capita total personal income. These quantities allow for measuring the consequences of increases in
4The employed definition of household income results in a small number of negative incomes (around 0.74 percent of the full
sample). For the baseline specification, we include all available households. Calculating the Gini coefficient after dropping
negative incomes as well as setting negative incomes to zero yields similar results, with a correlation > 0.99 to the Gini
coefficient based on all households for all states.
5Calculations are carried out using the R software packages provided by Lumley (2004, 2018) and Pessoa et al. (2018).
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uncertainty on the real side of the economy, putting special emphasis on labor market effects as well as
income reactions. For the empirical specification, we thus have a set of k = 4 quantities in yit (household
income inequality, total personal income, unemployment, and employment).
Four national macroeconomic quantities are included in zt , namely the consumer price index (CPI),
taken from the dataset presented inMcCracken andNg (2016) and consequently transformed into quarterly
frequency, US gross domestic product (GDP) obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,6 the one-year treasury rate and national macroeconomic
uncertainty.
Black Monday
Gulf War I
Clinton
election
Russian
Crisis/LTCM
Bush
election
9/11
Gulf War II Lehman/
TARP
Euro
crisis
Debt ceiling
dispute
Fiscal cliff
Government
shutdown
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1990 2000 2010
EP
U 
ind
ex
Fig. 1: Economic policy uncertainty and related events.
Notes: The solid blue line is the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index by Baker et al. (2016) normalized to the unit interval.
LTCM refers to the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, while TARP denotes the Troubled Asset Relief Program by
the United States government.
To capture national economic uncertainty, we rely on the overall economic policy uncertainty (EPU)
index provided by Baker et al. (2016). This index is comprised of three weighted components. The first
component is based on screening ten large US newspapers for economic and policy uncertainty related
keywords (weighted by 1/2) while the second component reflects temporary federal tax code provisions
(receiving a weight of 1/6). The last component uses the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey
of Professional Forecasters to capture expectations on the consumer price index and purchases of goods
and services by federal, state and local governments (each weighted by 1/6). Figure 1 provides some
intuition of the evolution of the uncertainty index over time, with peaks during events commonly associated
with high levels of economic and political uncertainty (for instance, the index reaches historically high
levels during the stock market crash in 1987, both Gulf Wars, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the Lehman
bankruptcy) while being low during periods of relative tranquility.
6Available for download at bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm.
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Finally, it should be noted that the uncertainty index is logarithmically transformed, while the one-
year treasury rate is in levels. For GDP and the CPI, we take log-differences. State-level quantities are
adjusted as follows. We deseasonalize the unemployment rates and include them in levels. The Gini
coefficients are logarithmically transformed, and employment and total personal income enter the model
in first log-differences.
3.2. Model specification and structural identification
For the empirical application the lag length equals P = Q = 1. Based on the deviance information
criterion (DIC, see Spiegelhalter et al., 2002) , we opt for F = 2 latent factors and select the appropriate
weights wi j . Specifically, the model is computed over a grid of alternative weighting schemes based on
k-nearest neighbors (for k = 3, . . . , 9), inverse distances and equal distances between i and j, respectively.7
For each of these models, the DIC is calculated and the specification that yields the smallest DIC (in our
case five nearest neighbors) is chosen.
Before proceeding, a brief word on structural identification is in order. In the present paper, we follow
Baker et al. (2016) and include the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index as the first variable in zt .
Identification of the model is then achieved by using a simple Cholesky decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix. This implies that all quantities in the system react to movements in uncertainty
contemporaneously, while for other shocks in the systemwe introduce a causal ordering. This specification
also mirrors the approach used in Bloom (2009) who adopts a stock market volatility index as a proxy for
uncertainty.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The following section presents the main empirical findings of the study. Section 4.1 displays the responses
of the national and subnational macroeconomic quantities with respect to movements in uncertainty while
Section 4.2 shows the dynamic responses of state-level inequality to national uncertainty shocks. To assess
the quantitative importance of uncertainty shocks in shaping the income distribution, we compute forecast
error variance and historical decompositions in Section 4.3. The last subsection aims at explaining the
differences in the dynamic responses of income inequality across space.
4.1. Dynamic responses of national and state-level macroeconomic quantities
We start our discussion by considering the responses of the national macroeconomic aggregates. The
impulse responses of the aggregates at the national level serve to assess whether our high-dimensional
model approach yields responses consistent with established findings in the literature and, moreover, to
shed some light on potential linkages between the national and state-level quantities. Figure 2 presents
the endogenous responses to a positive one standard error shock to the EPU index that amounts to an
immediate reaction of around 30 percent. All plots include the median response (in blue) for 20 quarters
alongside the 68 percentiles of the posterior distribution (in light blue). The red line denotes the zero line.
7For a survey of alternative weighting schemes, see Fischer and Wang (2011, pp. 19–26).
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(a) Consumer price index
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(b) Gross domestic product
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Fig. 2: Impulse responses of national US quantities following a national uncertainty shock.
Notes: The solid blue line is the median response, the shaded blue area represents the 16th and 84th percentiles. The red line
indicates the zero line. Results are based on 5,000 posterior draws. Sample period: 1985:Q1 – 2017:Q1. Front axis: quarters
after impact.
Starting with price reactions, Fig. 2(a) indicates that inflation significantly decreases by approximately
three percentage points after around one quarter, remaining negative for about three years with a tendency
to increase. This reaction can be traced back to strong declines in consumption which, in turn, lowers
demand for goods, and firms accordingly adjust prices. This mechanism is commonly referred to as the
aggregate demand channel. By contrast, there is only little evidence in favor of the upward pricing bias
channel (see, e.g., Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011) that states that firms increase prices to maximize
profits in the aftermath of an uncertainty shock.
Next, we consider the reactions of output in Fig. 2(b), measured in terms of GDP. The figure reveals
that GDP growth strongly declines in the short run, peaking after approximately one quarter. Output
reactions, however, turn insignificant after one year, and there exists some evidence of an overshoot in
real activity after roughly three years. This rebound in real activity can be attributed to the fact that
companies, when faced with elevated levels of macroeconomic uncertainty, tend to postpone investments
in the short run. However, if uncertainty dissipates, firms start investing again and this boosts output
through increasing investment. Recent literature (Jurado et al., 2015; Carriero et al., 2018; Mumtaz and
Theophilopoulou, 2017) finds only little evidence of a real activity overshoot but it is worth noting that
these studies estimate the uncertainty factor alongside the remaining model parameters, while studies
reporting some evidence for a rebound in output rely, as we do, on observed proxies of uncertainty (see,
e.g., Bloom, 2009).
The final national macroeconomic quantity is the one-year treasury rate, shown in Fig. 2(c).8 Consis-
tent with Bloom (2009), increases in uncertainty translate into lower interest rates. Notice that, without
8Instead of using the Federal Funds rate as a measure of the monetary policy stance, we opt for interest rate securities with
a slightly longer maturity due to the fact that our dataset covers the period of the zero lower bound on interest rates. Using
longer-run interest rates thus provides a broader picture of the monetary policy stance, effectively covering actions related to
forward guidance and unconventional monetary policy (Gertler and Karadi, 2015).
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imposing zero impact restrictions, this decrease tends to materialize after around one quarter following
the uncertainty shock hitting our model economy. This implies that the Federal Reserve counteracts the
detrimental impact of uncertainty shocks on output and prices by lowering key interest rates, but with at
least one quarter delay. At the peak (about two years), the decline in interest rates reaches roughly six
percentage points.
While Fig. 2 provides a picture on how macroeconomic fundamentals react to changes in uncertainty
at the national level, Figs. (3)–(5) asses how a national uncertainty shock impacts unemployment,
employment, and income at the regional level. Since presenting the responses of all states is infeasible,
we present census region-level rather than state-level impulse responses, usingweighted averages reflecting
the relative sizes of the economies (measured in terms of gross state product).9
Figure 3 indicates that unemployment increases in a hump-shaped manner, peaking after about a
year. The increase in unemployment ranges from 2.5 to 3.8 percentage points in the Midwest and
West, respectively. These reactions are consistent with Leduc and Liu (2016), who report increasing
unemployment to uncertainty shocks. It is noteworthy that the dynamic responses of unemployment turn
negative after around 3.5 years, in agreement with the decline in real GDP at the national level. This
finding appears to confirm the hypothesis that when faced with increased levels of uncertainty, firms alter
their behavior and postpone hiring new employees until the economic outlook becomes more secure.
Figure 3, moreover, suggests that cross-regional differences in unemployment responses are small.
(a) Midwest region
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Impulse response horizon
(b) Northeast region
−2
0
2
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Impulse response horizon
(c) South region
−2
0
2
4
0 5 10 15 20
Impulse response horizon
(d) West region
−2
0
2
4
0 5 10 15 20
Impulse response horizon
Fig. 3: Impulse response functions of unemployment in US states following a national uncertainty shock.
Notes: The solid blue line is the median response, the shaded blue area represents the 16th and 84th percentiles. The red line
indicates the zero line. Results are based on 5,000 posterior draws. Sample period: 1985:Q1 – 2017:Q1. Front axis: quarters
after impact.
Employment responses (see Fig. 4) tend to be inversely related to those reported for unemployment.
Instead of being hump-shaped, the impulse responses of employment indicate a pronounced immediate
reaction, yielding decreases in employment by around five percent throughout the regions. These labor
market responses, however, become smaller over the first two years of the impulse response horizon. After
approximately two years, companies start hiring again, and employment subsequently increases. Only
little cross-regional variation is visible, both in the size and shape of the dynamic responses between the
regional aggregates under scrutiny.
Finally, total personal income responses are displayed in Fig. 5. Across the census regions considered,
the results indicate pronounced and rather persistent but increasingly smaller declines in income, consistent
9For a definition of the census regions see Appendix B. All state-level quantities are available from the authors upon request.
10
UNCERTAINTY SHOCKS AND INCOME INEQUALITY
(a) Midwest region
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Fig. 4: Impulse response functions of employment in US states following a national uncertainty shock.
Notes: The solid blue line is the median response, the shaded blue area represents the 16th and 84th percentiles. The red line
indicates the zero line. Results are based on 5,000 posterior draws. Sample period: 1985:Q1 – 2017:Q1. Front axis: quarters
after impact.
with the aggregate decrease in real activity (see Fig. 2(b)), lead to weaker labor markets. While we can
identify some minor differences in the shape and timing of the responses, regional differences appear to
be somewhat muted.
(a) Midwest region
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(b) Northeast region
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Fig. 5: Impulse response functions of total personal income in US states following a national uncertainty
shock.
Notes: The solid blue line is the median response, the shaded blue area represents the 16th and 84th percentiles. The red line
indicates the zero line. Results are based on 5,000 posterior draws. Sample period: 1985:Q1 – 2017:Q1. Front axis: quarters
after impact.
To sum up, a national uncertainty shock yields reactions of real and financial quantities that are
consistent with Bloom (2009), Jurado et al. (2015), Baker et al. (2016), Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2018),
Carriero et al. (2018). When considering cross-regional variation in the impulse responses, little evidence
of heterogeneity (in terms of the estimated impulse response functions) is evident. We conjecture that
this may stem from the fact that our model assumes the autoregressive coefficients to originate from a
common distribution, effectively introducing parameter homogeneity across regions when supported by
the data.
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4.2. Impulse responses of income inequality
To assess how a national uncertainty shock affects income inequality in the US, we first compute state-
specific impulse responses, and average these to obtain responses at the level of the census regions for
presentational purposes, and then consider boxplots of the posterior mean of state-level responses across
the impulse response horizons to provide evidence on differentials between states and regions.
The regional impulse response functions of income inequality are presented in Fig. 6 that shows the
posterior median along with the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution of the responses of
income inequality across the census regions. These responses reveal substantial heterogeneity, as opposed
to the responses of the regional macroeconomic quantities described in Section 4.1. This heterogeneity
is not only related to statistical significance but also to the shape and direction of the dynamic responses.
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Fig. 6: Impulse response functions of household income inequality in US states following a national
uncertainty shock.
Notes: The solid blue line is the median response, the shaded blue area represents the 16th and 84th percentiles. The red line
indicates the zero line. Results are based on 5,000 posterior draws. Sample period: 1985:Q1 – 2017:Q1. Front axis: quarters
after impact.
One common feature that all regions share is the slow reaction of income inequality to uncertainty. It
is important to note that given our identification strategy, this slow reaction is not imposed a priori, but
purely driven by the data. One potential interpretation is that the presence of wage and price rigidities
translates into slower reactions of income inequality, with a potential delay of inequality responses that
ranges from three (in case of the Northeast and South regions) to six quarters (in case of the Midwest).
The results for the Midwest (see Fig. 6(a)) are broadly consistent with recent evidence provided for
the United Kingdom by Theophilopoulou (2018), who reports that inequality responses are positive in
the short run, turning negative in the long run. Even though we do not observe a significant decline after
about five quarters, there is some evidence that the initial increase in income inequality tends to fade
out. In contrast, the inequality responses for the South (see Fig. 6(c)) indicate a decline over the first two
quarters and a pronounced rebound after approximately ten quarters. The Northeast and West regions,
shown in Figs. 6(b) and 6(d), also suggest that inequality falls in the short run but with less evidence in
favor of a rebound after around 1.5 years.
If we consider the inequality responses in light of the reactions of the macroeconomic fundamentals
described in Section 4.1, it is worth noting that regions displaying declining inequality levels are typically
characterized by higher levels of capital income whereas the states located in the Midwest are generally
accompanied by lower levels of capital and higher shares of labor income. This is broadly consistent with
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theoretical evidence provided in Kasa and Lei (2018), who show that wealthy agents invest a relatively
high fraction of their wealth in risky assets. This strategy pays off during tranquil times, amplifying
inequality, but tends to perform poorly in crisis episodes, effectively leading to a reduction in inequality.
(a) Midwest region (b) Northeast region
(c) South region (d) West region
Fig. 7: Boxplot of median impulse response functions for household income inequality across states.
Notes: The red line indicates the zero line. Results are based on 5,000 posterior draws. Sample period: 1985:Q1 – 2017:Q1.
Front axis: quarters after impact. For definition of the ISO-2 codes, see Appendix B.
Averaging state-level responses to the regional level may mask important intra-regional variation of
inequality reactions. To provide some information on how much variation exists in the regions, Fig. 7
displays boxplots of the posterior mean responses for each state within a given region and across impulse
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response horizons. The spacing between the different parts of the boxes indicates the degree of cross-state
dispersion in the posterior mean responses while black dots indicate outlying states.
The boxplots provide some interesting features. First, for the Northeast region (see Fig. 7(b)) we
observe that if the reaction of income inequality (see Fig. 6(b)) is significant at a given time horizon,
the corresponding cross-state dispersion tends to be small and centered below zero. This is especially
true for short-term responses. Second, within-region variation in the South is evidently larger when
compared to the others, especially for medium-term responses. This indicates elevated heterogeneity in
terms of state-level responses within the region concerned. Third, for the South region, Virginia (VA)
and Arkansas (AR) appear to be dominant outliers, both displaying stronger reactions on average. In
the case of Arkansas, this implies more positive inequality responses while for Virginia, we observe
income inequality responses that are more negative. Finally, within theWest region, Alaska (AK) features
outlying responses that point towards strongly decreasing levels of income inequality.
4.3. The role of uncertainty shocks in explaining income inequality
In this section, we asses the quantitative contribution of uncertainty shocks to movements in household
income dispersion across regions. For this purpose, we consider the share of forecast error variance of
income inequality explained by the uncertainty shock (see Fig. 8) as well as historical decompositions
(see Fig. 9) that enable to shed light on the relevance of the uncertainty shock to explaining historical
movements in income inequality.
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Fig. 8: Forecast error variance decompositions for income inequality in US census regions.
Notes: The solid blue line is the median response, the shaded blue area represents the 16th and 84th percentiles. The red line
indicates the zero line. Results are based on 5,000 posterior draws. Sample period: 1985:Q1 – 2017:Q1. Front axis: quarters
after impact.
Figure 8 displays forecast error variance decompositions for income inequality and indicates – con-
sistent with Section 4.2 – pronounced differences across regions. We observe that the quantitative
contribution of the uncertainty shock in explaining the forecast error variance of income inequality ranges
from around two percent in the Northeast to about four percent in the Midwest, at the one-step-ahead
horizon. This share rises considerably with the forecast horizon, peaking at approximately seven percent
in the Midwest and South, while reaching roughly 3.5 percent in the Northeast. Notice that the share rises
over time across all regions under consideration.
Figure 9 shows the contribution of the identified uncertainty shock over time and across regions.
Several points are worth emphasizing. First, the quantitative relevance of the uncertainty shock is small
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Fig. 9: Historical contributions of uncertainty shocks to income inequality.
Notes: The blue bars indicate the contributions of uncertainty shocks to the averaged inequality time series. The red line
indicates the zero line. Results are based on the median of 5,000 posterior draws. Sample period: 1985:Q1 – 2017:Q1.
up to the beginning of the 1990s. This holds for all census regions. Second, for theMidwest and South, the
contributions are positive up to 2011. From 2011 onwards, the contributions turn negative. Interestingly,
this time span coincides with the period of the zero lower bound, indicating that there seems to be a
relationship between the inequality-uncertainty nexus and unconventional monetary policy. Finally, the
relative contributions strongly vary in size, with the importance of uncertainty shocks being highest in
the Midwest and smallest in the Northeast.
4.4. Explaining differences in inequality responses
For explaining differences in state-level responses of income inequality, we conduct a regression analysis.
As endogenous variable, we use the posterior median of the h-step ahead (for h = 0, 4, 8, 12, 16), cumu-
lative, peak, minimum, and maximum responses. Specifically, the responses of income inequality for all
states except the District of Columbia are regressed on a set of state-specific covariates averaged over
time and weighted by the corresponding state-level gross regional product. While the approach suffers
from issues like latent response variables, endogeneity, and potential model misspecification, it provides
a rough gauge of the underlying trends in the data (see Kose et al., 2003, for a similar exercise using a
dynamic factor model).
We choose nine explanatory variables that are potential determinants of income inequality. The first
variable (Higher Education) relates to the proportion of citizens holding a bachelor’s degree or higher
and serves to establish the relationship between human capital and income inequality. Data is obtained
from the US Census Bureau (Acemoglu, 1998; Autor et al., 2008). To control for differences in the
exposure to international trade and globalization, we include data on the state-specific value of exports
to all countries (Goldin and Katz, 2008) as the second explanatory variable (International Trade). Labor
market institutions and the degree of unionization have also been identified as possible determinants of
the distribution of income (Card et al., 2004). This is captured using information on the state-specific
minimumwages per hour (MinimumWage), and the union membership rate (Union Membership), defined
as the percentage of wage and salary workers who are members of unions, taken from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
There also exists a relationship between the sectoral composition of employment, economic develop-
ment, and the income distribution (see Kuznets, 1955). To account for this, data on the share of workers
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employed in the manufacturing sector is included as an additional covariate (Manufacturing). Piketty and
Saez (2003) provide evidence of profound changes in the composition of top incomes (relative positions
between capital and wage income) and their surging importance (Piketty et al., 2018; Aghion et al., 2019).
Correspondingly, data on the shares of income accruing to different parts of the income distribution across
US states from the World Inequality Database (Alvaredo et al., 2018) are included (Top One Percent and
Top 10 Percent). Furthermore, we calculate the share of wages and salaries proportional to total personal
income (Wage Share). The set of explanatory variables is completed using data on the share of income
related taxes to tax revenue in a state (Income Taxation), reflecting the relationship between the overall
level of taxation and pre-tax income (Piketty et al., 2014).
Table 1 shows the regression results. Most variables included turn out to have no significant effect on
income inequality reactions. In terms of significant effects, the sectoral allocation of employment within
states, the composition of income in terms of labor and capital income, and different income groups exert
some influence on inequality.
Starting with the share of employees in the manufacturing sector (Manufacturing), the results suggest
that more employees in manufacturing are associated with lower impact responses. When we use this
covariate to explain responses up to three-years-ahead, the coefficients change sign and point to a positive
relationship between inequality and the share of workers in manufacturing. Turning to the share of
wages and salaries in total personal income (Wage Share), the table shows that impact reactions tend
to significantly rise with the wage share. The sign of the effect changes when longer-run reactions
are considered, pointing towards a negative marginal relationship between the wage share and inequality
reactions. When explaining the peak effect of the responses, the share of income related taxes proportional
to overall tax revenues (Income Taxation) features a significantly negative regression coefficient. This
suggests a negative relationship between a higher dependency on income taxes and peak reactions of
inequality.
When considering the income composition and its potential effects of inequality responses, Tab. 1
highlights strong and significant effects associated with the income share covariates (Top One Percent and
Top 10 Percent). For all endogenous variables considered, we find a negative relationship between the
responses and the top one percent share. This pattern can be explained by noting that economic growth
and productivity gains unequally benefit incomes, translating into stronger growth for high incomes. Since
uncertainty shocks lead to a decline in real activity and adverse effects in financial markets, top incomes
decline proportionally stronger and this leads to a decline in household inequality (Piketty et al., 2018).
By contrast, the positive relationship between the income share of the top 10 percent and responses
of income inequality can be explained by the lower exposure of white collar professionals (e.g. lawyers,
managers, and physicians) to weakening labor markets, when compared to blue collar workers. Increasing
unemployment thus effectively weakens the bargaining position of blue collar workers, leading to wage
cuts that strongly impact income inequality.
5. CLOSING REMARKS
This paper focuses on the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty shocks and household income
inequality using a novel large-scale econometric framework. Our model enables to assess how an
unexpected increase in national uncertainty impacts the US economy at the state level, controlling for
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Table 1: Explaining state-level impulse responses of income inequality.
Impulse response
Impact Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Cumulative Peak Min. Max.
Intercept −0.015∗∗∗ −0.072 −0.041 −0.033 −0.026 −0.961 −0.116 −0.042 −0.041
(0.005) (0.048) (0.053) (0.047) (0.035) (0.647) (0.072) (0.028) (0.041)
Higher Education 0.001 −0.033 0.004 0.034 0.038 0.218 0.026 0.017 0.014
(0.005) (0.043) (0.048) (0.042) (0.031) (0.583) (0.065) (0.025) (0.037)
International Trade −0.002 −0.018 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.264 −0.027 −0.007 −0.016
(0.002) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.200) (0.022) (0.009) (0.013)
Union Membership 0.006 0.025 −0.043 −0.057 −0.027 −0.306 0.004 −0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034) (0.025) (0.471) (0.053) (0.020) (0.030)
Minimum Wage 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Income Taxation 0.001 −0.010 −0.014 −0.007 0.001 −0.116 −0.026∗ −0.003 −0.009
(0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.129) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008)
Manufacturing −0.024∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.058 −0.046 0.885 0.092 0.057∗ 0.030
(0.005) (0.049) (0.054) (0.048) (0.035) (0.659) (0.074) (0.029) (0.042)
Wage Share 0.011∗ 0.080 −0.005 −0.066 −0.074∗ −0.213 −0.028 −0.008 −0.012
(0.006) (0.056) (0.062) (0.054) (0.040) (0.749) (0.084) (0.033) (0.048)
Top One Percent −0.075∗∗∗ −0.164 −0.159 −0.280∗ −0.279∗∗ −4.797∗∗ −0.661∗∗∗ −0.107 −0.316∗∗
(0.016) (0.144) (0.160) (0.140) (0.104) (1.939) (0.216) (0.084) (0.123)
Top 10 Percent 0.057∗∗∗ 0.136 0.140 0.252∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 4.280∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.110 0.251∗∗
(0.014) (0.130) (0.143) (0.126) (0.093) (1.741) (0.194) (0.076) (0.111)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R2 0.573 0.310 0.251 0.329 0.434 0.242 0.284 0.774 0.643
Adjusted R2 0.467 0.137 0.064 0.161 0.292 0.053 0.104 0.718 0.554
Residual Error 0.605 5.531 6.115 5.357 3.970 74.246 8.283 3.231 4.719
F Statistic 5.373∗∗∗ 1.793∗ 1.342 1.960∗ 3.067∗∗∗ 1.280 1.583 13.703∗∗∗ 7.199∗∗∗
Notes: The sample consists of all US states (except the District of Columbia due to data limitations). The dependent variable refers to the value of the
impulse response function on impact, after one to four years, the cumulative impulse response function after 20 quarters, the level at the peak of the response,
the minimum and the maximum response. Explanatory variables are the share of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher (Higher Education), the
exposure to international trade measured using the value of exports (International Trade), union membership rates of the workforce (Union Membership), the
minimum wage level (MinimumWage), the share of income related taxes related to overall tax revenue (Income Taxation), the proportion of workers employed
in the manufacturing sector (Manufacturing), the share of wages in total personal income (Wage Share), and the share of income accruing to the top 1 and top
10 percent of the income distribution (Top One Percent and Top 10 Percent), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
potential spillovers between states. Moreover, to control for national movements in key macroeconomic
aggregates, we include an additional VAR specification that is linked to the state models in a dynamic
fashion.
The model is used to assess how national quantities react to movements in uncertainty, yielding results
that are in line with the literature. Specifically, increases in uncertainty translate into a drop in real
activity, prices, as well as interest rates. Consistent with the previous literature on uncertainty shocks,
reactions of output provide considerable evidence in favor of a real activity overshoot. Regional reactions
in unemployment, employment, and income confirm the findings based on national data, namely increases
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in unemployment, declines in employment, and a decrease in income. One key result is that differences
across regions are small.
Reactions of income inequality to uncertainty shocks reveal that increases in uncertainty yield het-
erogeneous responses across space. Three out of the four census regions considered exhibit a negative
reaction of the Gini coefficient while for theMidwest, we find that income inequality increases after around
a year. This effect, however, fades out after a few quarters and eventually points towards decreasing levels
of inequality, evidenced by significant posterior mass located below zero. For the South, the initial decline
in income inequality is reversed after around ten quarters, with significant evidence for an increase in
inequality in the medium term.
The quantitative contribution of the uncertainty shock in explaining income inequality is assessed by
conducting a forecast error variance decomposition. The findings, again, point towards a large degree of
heterogeneity across space. For some regions, uncertainty shocks play an important role in shaping income
inequality dynamics whereas for others this role is somewhat smaller but still substantial. Historical
decompositions enable us to investigate whether and when uncertainty shocks played a prominent role in
determining income inequality over the estimation period.
We explain the state-specific impulse response functions for income inequality by a regression analysis
featuring various quantities typically identified as drivers of income inequality. The results suggest that
the reaction of household income inequality is affected by the composition of income and labor market
fundamentals such as sectoral employment.
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A. FULL CONDITIONAL POSTERIOR SAMPLING
The prior setup described in Section 2 translates into a set of full conditional posterior distributions that
have a well-known form. In what follows, we only briefly summarize the steps involved in obtaining
a valid draw from the joint posterior distribution, and provide additional references that include more
details on the exact posterior moments.
Our Gibbs sampler iterates between the following steps:
(i) The VAR coefficients in βi can be sampled on an equation-by-equation basis, where conditional
on Λ ft , the full conditional posterior distribution follows a Gaussian distribution with mean and
variance taking a standard form (see, for instance, Zellner, 1973)
(ii) Using the fact that conditional on knowing {βi}Ni=1 the conditional posterior of µ does not depend
on the data leads to a Gaussian full conditional posterior distribution that takes a well-known form
(Koop, 2003).
(iii) The VAR coefficients for the national quantities Dp and Sq are sampled analogously to the state-
specific parameters from multivariate Gaussian distributions on an equation-by-equation basis.
(iv) The free elements in Λ can, again, be simulated on an equation-by-equation basis. Notice that
conditional on the latent factors, Λ is obtained by estimating a sequence of standard Bayesian
regression models with heteroscedastic innovations (see Aguilar and West, 2000)
(v) For the latent factors { ft }Tt=1, we simulate the full history by drawing from a set of independent
Gaussian distributions,
ft |• ∼ N ( f t, Pt ) (A.1)
Pt = Ht − ΥtΘtΥ′t
Υt = HtΛ
′Θ−1t
f t = Υtεt .
(vi) The full history of the log-volatilities is sampled using the algorithm outlined in Kastner and
Frühwirth-Schnatter (2014); see also Kastner (2016).
We pick starting values for the parameters of the model and cycle through the algorithm described above
for 50, 000 times, discarding the first 25, 000 draws as burn-in. For inference, we consider every fifth draw.
It is worth mentioning that the employed algorithm exhibits excellent mixing and convergence properties.
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B. DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES INTO CENSUS REGIONS AND STATES
Table B: Census regions and US states.
Census Regions States
Midwest Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA), Kansas (KS), Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN), Missouri (MO),
Nebraska (NE), North Dakota (ND), Ohio (OH), South Dakota (SD), Wisconsin (WI)
Northeast Connecticut (CT), Maine (ME), Massachusetts (MA), New Hampshire (NH), New Jersey (NJ),
New York (NY), Pennsylvania (PA), Rhode Island (RI), Vermont (VT)
South Alabama (AL), Arkansas (AR), Delaware (DE), District of Columbia (DC), Florida (FL), Kentucky
(KY), Georgia (GA), Louisiana (LA), Maryland (MD), Mississippi (MS), North Carolina (NC),
Oklahoma (OK), South Carolina (SC), Tennessee (TN), Texas (TX), Virginia (VA),
West Virginia (WV)
West Alaska (AK), Arizona (AZ), California (CA), Colorado (CO), Hawaii (HI), Idaho (ID), Montana (MT),
Nevada (NV), New Mexico (NM), Oregon (OR), Utah (UT), Washington (WA), Wyoming (WY)
Notes: Abbreviations of states in parentheses.
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Fig. B: Map of the four census regions of the United States.
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